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History Lessons for a General Theory of Law and
Technology
Gregory N. Mandel ∗
INTRODUCTION
Our society thrives on new technology and technological
advance. We enjoy the internet, clothes that do not wrinkle or
stain, and the wonders of medical biotechnology. A century of
innovation has improved our lives in myriad ways. We are
healthier, wealthier, and, if not necessarily happier, have a
vastly greater variety of options for how to spend our leisure
time.
The marvels of technological advance are not always riskfree. The risks presented by new technologies can take varying
forms: deleterious effects on human health or the environment,
concerns about individual autonomy and privacy, or concerns
relating to community or moral values. Such risks and
perceived risks often create new issues and disputes to which
© 2007 Gregory N. Mandel.
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the legal system must respond. Are various means of copying
information via the internet copyright infringement? Do the
nanofibers that confer beneficial properties to clothing pose
health or environmental risks? Is it acceptable to conduct
embryonic stem cell research?
The new legal issues created by technological advance
frequently are quite challenging. Such issues often raise
questions that are at the forefront of scientific knowledge, and
therefore may not only be incomprehensible to the average
person, but also not fully (or even well) understood by scientific
experts in the relevant field. In addition, the issues often
present new variations that challenge current understandings
of the law, even where the limits of scientific knowledge are not
critical to the issue’s resolution. In the face of this limited
knowledge and understanding, generally lay legislative,
executive, administrative, and judicial actors must continue to
establish and rule on laws that govern and decide such
uncharted disputes.
My contribution to this symposium, concerning whether
and to what extent there can be a general theory of law and
technology, focuses on lessons that can be learned from past
responses to once-new legal issues created by technological
advance. Studying how prior law and technology issues were
handled, and particularly how they were sometimes
mishandled, provides valuable lessons for responding to
current and future law and technology issues as they arise.
The history lessons do not produce a complete road map for
responding to each new law and technology issue — such a
guide is not achievable considering the vast variety of
technological change. But the lessons do provide a number of
useful guidelines for how to confront novel law and technology
challenges. In this symposium article, I propose three lessons:
(1) that preexisting legal categories may no longer apply for
new law and technology issues; (2) that decision-makers be
careful to avoid being blinded by the marvels of new technology
in deciding law and technology cases; and (3) that the types of
new law and technology disputes can be unforeseeable. These
are just three examples of useful lessons; they are not intended
to be a comprehensive list, and more suggestions are welcome.
Critically for any discussion of a general theory of law and
technology, I contend that these guidelines are applicable
across a wide variety of technologies, even those that we cannot
conceive of presently.
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OLD CATEGORIES MAY NO LONGER APPLY

The claim that lessons from one technology can be exported
to another technology is supported by examining the legal
system’s reaction to historic technological advances. Lessons
learned from these analyses are applicable today, even though
the technologies to which we would apply them now were
inconceivable in the periods from which the lessons are derived.
Perhaps the most important lesson to be learned from the
history of legal responses to technological advance is that a
decision-maker must be careful when compartmentalizing a
new law and technology issue into a preexisting category.
Lawyers and judges are trained to work in a system of
precedent that depends on categorizing cases according to
existing legal rules. The routine response to new issues, not
surprisingly, is to try to analogize them to existing legal
categorization. Such a response is often rational. But, where
the new issue arises as a result of technological change, the old
categories may no longer apply. In order to handle a new
technology issue, one often must delve deeper, into the basis for
the existing system of legal categorization. Examples from the
Nineteenth century illustrate this point.
A. THE TELEGRAPH
Before fiber optics and Wi-Fi, the first means of
contemporaneous long-distance communication was the
telegraph. On May 24, 1844, Samuel Morse sent the world’s
first telegraph message, “What Hath God Wrought.” 1
Telegraph infrastructure rose hand-in-hand with the railroads,
and in a short time (on a nineteenth century technological
diffusion scale), both criss-crossed the country and were in
heavy use. 2
Unsurprisingly, the advent of the telegraph also brought
new legal disputes. One such type of dispute was contract
disputes concerning miscommunicated telegraph messages. 3

1. See Library of Congress, American Memory, Today in History: May
24, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/today/may24.html (last visited Apr. 7,
2007). This message was taken from the Bible, Numbers 33:23. It was
suggested to Morse by Annie Ellworth, daughter of a friend. Library of
Congress, supra.
2. See Inventors.About.com, History of the Telegraph and Telegraphy,
http://inventors.about.com/library/inventors/bltelegraph.htm (last visited Apr.
07, 2007).
3. See, e.g., Parks v. Alta Cal. Telegraph Co., 13 Cal. 422 (Cal. 1859).
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At first glance, this may appear to present a standard contract
issue, but analysis of a pair of cases reveals otherwise.
Parks v. Alta California Telegraph Co. 4 concerned a
contract under which Alta was to send a telegraph message for
Parks. 5 Alta failed to send the message in a timely manner,
causing a loss for Parks, and Parks sued Alta to recover for the
loss. 6 The outcome of the case hinged on whether a telegraph
company was a common carrier. 7 Common carriers, such as
companies that transported goods, were automatically insurers
of the delivery of the goods. 8 If Alta was a common carrier, it
necessarily insured delivery of Parks’ message, and would be
liable for Parks’ loss. 9 In contrast, if Alta was not a common
carrier, it did not insure delivery of the message, and would
only be liable for the cost of the telegraph. 10
The court held that telegraph companies were common
carriers. 11 Companies that delivered goods, prior to telegraphs,
These companies, therefore,
also delivered letters. 12
automatically insured delivery of the letters they were
carrying, and were liable for any delivery failures. 13 The court
reasoned, “[t]here is no difference in the general nature of the
legal obligation of the contract between carrying a message
along a wire and carrying goods or a package along a route.
The physical agency may be different, but the essential nature
of the contract is the same.” 14 Other than this relatively
circular reasoning about the “essential nature” and there being
“no difference,” the court did not further explain the basis for
its conclusion. In the Parks court’s view, “[t]he rules of law
which govern the liability of Telegraph Companies are not new.

4. See id. at 424.
5. See id.
6. See id.
7. See id. at 423-24.
8. See id. at 424-25.
9. See id. at 423.
10. See id.
11. See id. at 424.
12. See, e.g., Gordon Stimmell, U.S. Carrier, Locals, & Independent Mails,
http://www.uspcs.org/uspcsCarriers_Locals.html (last visited, Apr. 07, 2007) (a
history of private mail services). See also United States Postal Service,
History
of
the
US
Postal
Service,
1779-1993,
http://www.usps.com/history/his2.htm (last visited Apr. 07, 2007).
13. See Parks, 13 Cal. at 424-25.
14. Id. at 424.
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They are old rules applied to new circumstances.” 15 The court
analogized the delivery of a message by telegraph to the
delivery of a message (a letter) by physical means, and since
letter-carriers were common carriers, it concluded that
telegraph companies must be as well. 16
Breese v. U.S. Telegraph Co. 17 also concerned a dispute
over a telegraph message.
Breese contracted with U.S.
Telegraph to send a telegraph message to buy $700 worth of
gold. 18 The message received was to buy $7,000 in gold. 19
Unfortunately, the price of gold dropped, and Breese sued U.S.
Telegraph for the loss. 20 Here, U.S. Telegraph’s form for
sending a telegraph included a notation that, for important
messages, the sender should always have the message sent
back, at an additional charge, to ensure that there were no
errors in delivery. 21 The form stated that if the message was
not repeated, U.S. Telegraph was not responsible for any
error. 22
Like Parks, Breese hinged on whether a telegraph company
was a common carrier. 23 If telegraph companies were common
carriers, U.S. Telegraph was necessarily an insurer of delivery
of the message, and could not limit its liability as it attempted
on the telegraph form. 24 The court concluded that telegraph
companies are not common carriers. 25 It did not offer a
reasoned explanation for its conclusion, beyond stating that the
law of contract governs, 26 a point irrelevant to the issue of
whether telegraph companies are common carriers.
Though Parks and Breese reached different conclusions,
both courts based their decisions on whether telegraph
companies were common carriers. 27 The Parks court believed

15. Id.
16. See id. at 425 (“The process of ascertainment is the same in this as in
other cases of carriers.”).
17. Breese v. U.S. Telegraph Co., 48 N.Y. 132 (N.Y. 1871).
18. See id. at 136.
19. See id. at 137.
20. See id.
21. See id. at 133.
22. See id. at 133-34.
23. See id. at 132.
24. See id. at 141.
25. See id. at 142.
26. See id. at 139.
27. See id. at 142; Parks v. Alta Cal. Telegraph Co., 13 Cal. 422, 425 (Cal.
1859).
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that telegraph messages were not relevantly different from
previous methods of message delivery, and therefore that
telegraph companies were common carriers. 28 The Breese
court, on the other hand, considered telegraph messages to be a
new form of message delivery, distinguishable from prior
systems, and therefore not bound by the old common carrier
rules, but only by contract. 29 Our analysis need not determine
which court had the better view. 30 The comparison, however,
reveals two important points: (1) neither court engaged in the
appropriate analysis to determine whether telegraph
companies should be held to be common carriers, and (2)
neither court engaged in the appropriate analysis to determine
whether a telegraph company should be liable for an error in
delivery of a telegraph message.
New legal issues created by technological advance often
raise the question of whether the technology is similar enough
to the prior state of the art such that the new technology should
be governed by similar, existing rules, or whether the new
technology is different enough such that it should be governed
by new or different rules. This question cannot be resolved
simply by comparing the function of the new technology to the
function of the prior technology. Rather, a decision-maker
must consider the rationale for the existing legal categories in
the first instance, and then determine whether that rationale
applies to the new technology. Legal categories (such as
common carrier) are only that — legal constructs. Such
constructs may need to be revised in the face of technological
change.
The relevant metric by which the extension of the common
carrier category should have been evaluated was not the
physical activity involved (message delivery) but the basis for
the legal construct. The rationale for common carrier liability,
for instance, may have been to institute a least-cost avoider

28. See Parks, 13 Cal. at 425.
29. See Breese v. U.S. Telegraph Co., 48 N.Y. 132, 139 (N.Y. 1871).
30. This is not a simple doctrinal question. A common carrier is one who
holds themselves out to the public as engaged in the business of
transportation of persons or property for compensation. BLACK’S LAW
DICTIONARY 226 (8th ed. 2004) (“A commercial enterprise that holds itself out
to the public as offering to transport freight or passengers for a fee.”). To
determine whether a telegraph company is a common carrier under this
definition, one would have to determine whether a telegraph message is
property.
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regime and reduce transaction costs (likely among other
reasons). 31 Prior to the advent of the telegraph, there was little
a customer could do to insure the proper delivery of her
package or letter once handed to a carrier. Telegraphs,
however, offered a new, easy, cheap method of self-insurance,
as revealed in Breese—having the message returned to ensure
that it had been properly delivered. 32 It is possible that this
change in technology was substantial enough that the old legal
rules should no longer apply. But, this is an analysis that
neither court reached.
That preexisting legal categorization might not apply to
new technologies may appear to be a simple error that we
would not expect today’s courts to make. Chalking up this legal
error to archaic legal decision-making, however, is too
dismissive, as cases concerning modern message delivery
reveal.
B. THE INTERNET
The growth of the internet and email usage in the 1990s
resulted in a dramatic increase in unsolicited email messages.
These messages became known as “spam,” apparently after a
famous Monty Python skit in which spam is a disturbingly
ubiquitous menu item. 33 Spam was (and is) a significant
annoyance for email users. However, it is potentially an even
greater problem for internet service providers who are forced to
make additional investments to process and store extra
messages or face the prospect of losing customers annoyed by
spam filling their in-boxes. 34

One internet provider, CompuServe, brought suit against a

31. See Eli M. Noam, Principles for the Communications Act of 2034: The
Superstructure of Infrastructure, 47 FED. COMM. L.J. 317, 320 (1994).
32. See Breese, 48 N.Y. at 134.
33. See
Dictionary.com,
Definition
of
“Spam,”
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/spam (last visited Apr. 07, 2007).
34. Although private solutions to the spam problem (email message
filters) would eventually work with some degree of success, they were not
particularly well developed in the early days of spam. See, e.g., CompuServe
Inc. v. Cyber Promotions, Inc., 962 F. Supp. 1015, 1017-19 (S.D. Ohio 1997).
The current generation of spammers, however, have now figured out how to
evade these email filters, making spam more of a problem than it has been in
several years. See Dan Woog & Carolynn Ananian, Spam, Spam, Everywhere,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2006, at A18.
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CompuServe had
particularly persistent spammer. 35
attempted to technologically block the spam, but had not been
CompuServe, however, had a problem in
successful. 36
developing a legal theory for its lawsuit.
Use of the
CompuServe email system by a non-client did not create an
obvious cause of action in contract, tort, property, or other area
of law. In fact, such use, as a general matter, was highly
desired and necessary for the email system to operate—
CompuServe’s clients needed to be able to receive email from
others.
CompuServe developed a somewhat ingenious claim—that
the spammer was trespassing on CompuServe’s personal
property (its computers) violating an ancient doctrine known as
trespass to chattels. 37 Trespass to chattels is a common law
doctrine prohibiting the unauthorized use of another’s personal
property. 38 Trespass to chattels, however, requires physical
contact with the chattel, that the plaintiff was dispossessed of
the chattel permanently or for a substantial period of time, and
that the chattel was impaired in condition, quality or value, or
that bodily harm was caused. 39 Application of these elements
to spam is not straight-forward. Spam does not physically
contact a computer, does not appear to dispossess a computer,
and does not appear to harm the computer. CompuServe
argued, and the court held, however, that the electronic signals
by which the email was sent constituted physical contact with
the chattel, that the use of band-width dispossessed the
computer, and that the value of CompuServe’s computers was
diminished by the burden of the mass spamming. 40
While one can understand the court’s sympathy for
CompuServe’s plight, the CompuServe court committed the
same error as the courts in Parks and Breese—it did not
consider the basis for legal categorization before extending a
category to new disputes created by new technology. Clear
extensions of the CompuServe holding make evident that the
court’s categorization was problematic. All unsolicited email,
physical mail, and telephone calls would constitute trespass to

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.

CompuServe, 962 F. Supp. at 1015.
Id. at 1019.
Id.
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1542-43 (8th ed. 2004).
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 218 (1965).
Compuserve, 962 F. Supp. at 1022.
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chattels under this reasoning, a holding that would surprise
many. This result would create a common law cause of action
against telemarketers and companies sending junk mail. 41
Even more surprising, advertisements on broadcast radio and
television would also constitute trespass to chattels. Under the
court’s reasoning, individuals would have a cause of action
against ABC, CBS, and NBC for airing commercials, which
physically contact the television through electronic signals,
dispossess the television to at least the same extent as spam
affects a computer, and diminish the value of the television by
carrying the extraneous material. 42 An argument that a
television viewer should expect or implicitly consents to
commercials would apply equally to a computer user expecting
or implicitly consenting to spam as a result of connecting to the
internet.
The problem with the CompuServe decision lies in its
failure to recognize the difference between use of an (ethereal)
email system and use of physical property. This technological
difference makes a difference for the legal categories into which
the disputes should be placed. The dispute in CompuServe was
not really over the use of physical property (computers), but
over interference with CompuServe’s business and customers.
The legal solution to this new type of problem would have been
better served by recognizing this difference.
In sum, courts should not expect that common law, often
developed centuries earlier, will be well-suited for handling
new law and technology issues. The preexisting categories may
be applicable in some cases, but the only way to determine this
is to examine the basis for the categories in the first instance,
and whether that basis is satisfied by extension of the doctrine.
This analysis will vary for different disputes and technologies,
and often will require consideration of the impact of the
decision on the development and dissemination of the
technology, as well as on the economy and social welfare.
II. DO NOT BE BLINDED BY THE TECHNOLOGY
A second history lesson for law and technology concerns
the need for decision-makers to look beyond the technology

41. Many, presumably, would welcome such a cause of action, but this is a
different question from whether it is appropriate or was intended.
42. Trespass to chattels arguably would not apply to cable providers, who
have entered a contract with the cable customer, and therefore presumably
have received implicit consent to transmit the commercials.
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involved in a dispute to focus on the legal issues in question.
Sometimes decision-makers have a tendency to be blinded by
spectacular technological achievement.
People v. Jennings 43 was the first case in the United States
in which fingerprint evidence was admitted to establish
identity. Jennings was charged with murder. Critical to the
case against Jennings was the testimony of four fingerprint
experts matching Jennings’ fingerprints to the prints of four
fingers from a left hand found at the scene of the crime. 44
The fingerprint experts were employed in police
departments and other law enforcement capacities. 45 They
testified, in varying manners, to certain numbers of points of
resemblance between Jennings’ fingerprints and the crime
scene prints, and each concluded that the prints were made by
the same person. 46 The court admitted the testimony as expert
scientific evidence. The bases for admission identified in the
opinion were that fingerprint evidence was already admitted in
European countries, reliance on encyclopedias and treatises on
criminal investigation, and the experience of the expert
witnesses themselves. 47
Upon examination, the bases for admission are weak and
fail to establish the critical evidentiary requirement of
reliability.
None of the encyclopedias or treatises cited
discussed scientific support for the use of fingerprints to
establish identity, let alone demonstrating its reliability. 48 In a
similar vein, the court identified that the four expert witnesses
each had been studying fingerprint identification for several
years, but never mentions any testimony or other evidence
concerning the reliability of fingerprint analysis itself.
Identification of a number of points of resemblance between
prints (an issue on which the expert testimony varied) provides
little evidence of identity without knowing how many points of
resemblance are needed for a match, how likely it is for there to
be a number of points of resemblance between different people,
or how likely it is for experts to incorrectly identify points of
resemblance. No evidence on these matters was provided.

43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

252 Ill. 534 (Ill. 1911).
Id. at 548-49.
Id. at 547-48.
Id.
Id. at 546-47.
Id.
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Reading the Jennings opinion, one is left with the
impression that the court was simply very impressed with the
idea of fingerprint identification. Fingerprinting was perceived
to be an exciting new scientific ability and crime-fighting tool.
The court, for instance, provides substantial description of the
experts’ qualifications and their testimony, despite its failure to
discuss the reliability of fingerprint identification. 49 It is not
surprising, considering the court’s amazement with fingerprint
identification, that the court deferred to the experts in
admitting the evidence, despite the lack of evidence of
reliability and the experts’ obvious self-interest in having the
testimony admitted—this was, after all, now their line of
employment.
Jump forward from fingerprint identification at the
beginning of the twentieth century to DNA identification at the
end of the century.
Oregon v. Lyons 50 concerned the
admissibility of a new method of DNA typing, the “PCR
replicant method,” a process for determining the probability of
a match between a defendant’s DNA and DNA obtained at the
scene of a crime. 51
Despite almost a century gap separating the opinions, the
similarity in deficiencies between the Jennings and Lyons
courts’ analyses of the admissibility of a new form of scientific
evidence are remarkable. In Lyons, the court similarly relies
on the use of the method in question in other fields as a basis
for its reliability in a criminal case. The PCR method had been
used in genetics, but only in limited ways in the field of
No evidence was provided concerning the
forensics. 52
reliability of the PCR replicant method under crime scene
conditions. The Lyons court also relied on the expert witness’s
own testimony that he followed proper protocols as evidence
that there was no error and, even more problematically, that
the method itself was reliable. 53 Finally, the PCR replicant
method expert also had a vested interest in the test being
considered reliable—again, this was his line of employment. In
both cases the courts appear simply impressed and excited by
the technology. The Lyons decision includes not only a lengthy
description of the PCR replicant method process, but also an

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 546-49.
863 P.2d 1303 (Or. Ct. App. 1993).
See id. at 1306.
Id. at 1309.
Id. at 1309-10.
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extended discussion of DNA, all of which turns out to be
irrelevant to the issue of reliability or the case. 54
In fairness to the courts, there was an additional similarity
between Jennings and Lyons: in both cases the defense failed to
introduce competing experts to challenge the reliability of the
identification evidence.
In DNA typing cases, defense attorneys learned to
introduce their own experts to challenge the admissibility of
These experts challenged
new forms of DNA typing. 55
proffered DNA evidence on numerous grounds, from problems
with the theory of DNA identification (such as assumptions
about population genetics) to problems with the method’s
execution (such as the lack of laboratory standards or
procedures). 56 These challenges led geneticists and biologists
to air disputes concerning DNA typing in scientific journals,
and eventually to the National Research Council convening two
distinguished panels on the matter. 57 A number of significant
problems were identified concerning methods of DNA
identification, and courts in some instances held DNA evidence
inadmissible. 58 Eventually, new procedures were instituted
and standardized, and sufficient data was gathered such that
courts now routinely admit DNA evidence. 59
The challenges to DNA identification methods actually led,
in turn, to challenges to the admissibility of fingerprint
identification evidence, an issue which still had not been
adequately addressed despite its long use and mythical status
in crime-solving lore. 60 The bases for these challenges included
the lack of objective and proven standards for establishing that
two prints match, the lack of an established error rate, 61 and
54. Id.
55. Jennifer L. Mnookin, Fingerprint Evidence in an Age of DNA
Profiling, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 13, 51-56 (2001).
56. See, e.g., People v. Mohit 579 N.Y.S.2d 990, 991-93 (N.Y. Crim. Ct.
1992) (challenging DNA based on an uncommon ancestry); People v. Castro,
545 N.Y.S.2d 985, 986-97 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1989) (challenging the procedures
used in the testing laboratory); Mnookin, supra note 55, at 51-56.
57. See JAMES F. CROW ET AL., COMMITTEE ON DNA FORENSIC SCIENCE,
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE EVALUATION OF FORENSIC DNA (NAT’L ACAD.
PRESS 1996), available at http://newton.nap.edu/html/DNA/.
58. See, e.g., Castro, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 999.
59. See Mnookin, supra note 56, at 54-56.
60. Id. at 57-70.
61. A 1995 proficiency test of fingerprint examiners, for instance, found
that slightly less than half of them received a perfect score; 22% made an
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the lack of statistical information concerning the likelihood that
two people would have fingerprints with a given number of
corresponding features. 62 In 2002, a district court judge held
that evidence of identity based on fingerprints was
inadmissible because it was unreliable. 63 This holding led to
somewhat of an uproar and the Unites States filed a motion to
reconsider. The court held a hearing on the accuracy of
fingerprint identification, at which two FBI agents testified.
The court reversed its earlier decision and admitted the
fingerprint testimony. 64
The lesson learned from these cases for law and technology
is relatively straight-forward: decision-makers must not get
blinded by the wonder or promise of new technology when
judging the new legal issues created by impressive
technological advance. It is a lesson that is easy to state, but
clearly more difficult to apply in practice, particularly when a
decision-maker is confronted with the new technology for the
first time and a cadre of experts testifies to its spectacular
abilities.
III. NEW TECHNOLOGY DISPUTES ARE
UNFORESEEABLE
The final history lesson for a general theory of law and
technology offered in this article is the most difficult to
implement: decision-makers must remain cognizant of the
limits of their knowledge and ability to foresee new technology
issues. It is inevitable that legal disputes concerning the new
technology will be handled under the preexisting legal scheme
in early stages of technological development. At this stage,
there often will not be enough information and knowledge
about nascent technologies to develop or modify appropriate
legal rules, or there may not have been enough time to
establish new statutes, regulations, or common law for
managing the technology.

erroneous identification, identifying a match where none existed. Id. at 59-60.
62. Id. at 57-70.
63. United States v. Llera-Plaza, Nos. CR. 98-362-10, CR. 98-362-11, 98362-12, 2002 WL 27305, at *517-18 (E.D. Pa. 2002), vacated and superseded,
188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002). The court, in perhaps a Solomonic twist,
held that experts could testify to the similarities and differences between
fingerprints, though the experts were not permitted to present evaluation
testimony as to their opinion that a particular latent print was or was not the
print of a particular person. Id.
64. U.S. v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549, 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002).

MANDEL G. History Lessons for a General Theory of Law and Technology. MINN. J.L. SCI. &
TECH. 2007;8(2):551-570.

564

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 8:2

In addition, there often appears to be an inclination to
handle new technology disputes under existing rules. 65 This
response is usually the easiest, both administratively and
psychologically. Not surprisingly, however, the preexisting
legal structure may prove a poor match for new technology.
Often there will be gaps or other problems with applying the
existing legal system to a new technology issue. The regulation
of biotechnology serves as a useful example.
A. BIOTECHNOLOGY
As the biotechnology industry developed in the early 1980s,
the federal government determined that bioengineered
products generally would be regulated under the alreadyexisting statutory and regulatory structure. 66 The basis for
this decision, established in the Coordinated Framework for
Regulation of Biotechnology, was a determination that the
process of biotechnology was not considered inherently risky,
and therefore that only the products of biotechnology, not the
process itself, required oversight. 67
This decision was questionable.
As a result of the
Coordinated Framework, biotechnology products are regulated
under a dozen statutes and by five different agencies and
services. 68 Experience with biotechnology regulation under the
Coordinated Framework has revealed gaps in biotechnology
regulation; inefficient overlaps in regulation; inconsistencies
among agencies in their regulation of similarly situated
biotechnology products; and instances of agencies acting
outside of their areas of expertise. 69
The most significant gap in biotechnology regulation is
likely the lack of Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
involvement in the review and approval of numerous
genetically modified plants and animals that could have a
65. See Gregory Mandel, Gaps, Inexperience, Inconsistencies, and
Overlaps: Crisis in the Regulation of Genetically Modified Plants and Animals,
45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2167, 2257-58 (2004).
66. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg.
23,302-09, 23,313-14, 23,336 (June 26, 1986).
67. See id. at 23,302-03.
See also NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL,
GENETICALLY MODIFIED PEST-PROTECTED PLANTS: SCIENCE AND REGULATION
25-26 (2000) [hereinafter NRC 2000 REPORT].
68. Mandel, supra note 65, at 2228.
69. See, supra note 65, for a comprehensive discussion of the regulation of
genetically modified products and related issues.
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significant impact on the environment, and in certain instances
the lack of sufficient review of the environmental impacts of
such products by any agency. 70 As another example, it is
unclear whether any agency has regulatory authority over
transgenic animals not intended for human food or to produce
human biologics. 71
Regulatory inconsistencies have created difficulties as well.
The Coordinated Framework identified two priorities for the
regulation of biotechnology by multiple agencies: that the
agencies regulating genetically modified products “adopt
consistent definitions” and that the agencies implement
scientific reviews of “comparable rigor.” 72 As a result of
constraints created by primary reliance on preexisting statutes,
however, the agencies involved in the regulation of
biotechnology
define
identical
regulatory
constructs
Similarly in violation of the Coordinated
differently. 73

70. See id. at 2234-36.
71. See OFFICE OF SCI. & TECH. POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, CASE STUDY NO. IV: FARM ANIMAL (GOAT) THAT PRODUCES
HUMAN
DRUGS
14
(2001),
available
at
http://www.ostp.gov/html/ceq_ostp_study5.pdf. It is possible that the Animal
and Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS) could exercise authority
pursuant to the Animal Health Protection Act (AHPA) of 2002, 7 U.S.C. §§
8301-8320 (2000 & Supp. 2003), to regulate genetically modified animals to
the extent such animals may affect the health of livestock (in much the same
manner as APHIS regulates genetically modified plants based on their
potential to pose threats to plants). See Tadlock Cowan & Geoffrey S. Becker,
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS, BIOTECHNOLOGY IN ANIMAL AGRICULTURE:
STATUS AND CURRENT ISSUES (2006) (noting this potential). APHIS authority
here would turn on the meaning of “disease” under the AHPA, a term to be
defined by the Secretary of Agriculture. 7 U.S.C. § 8302(3). The Secretary
may be able to define disease in such a manner as to include genetic
modification of animals, although this would not be consistent with how the
Secretary has defined the term previously, so whether such a definition would
survive judicial review is not clear. See, e.g., 7 C.F.R. § 319.59-1 (2004)
(defining “disease” in another agricultural context to include “its common
meaning [and] a disease agent which incites a disease”). In addition, the
legislative history of the AHPA is quite sparse and does not indicate that such
a broad interpretation was intended.
72. Coordinated Framework for Regulation of Biotechnology, 51 Fed. Reg.
23,302-03 (June 26, 1986).
73. Genetically modified pest-protected plants, for example, are regulated
by three different agencies, each of which identify the regulated product and
define the regulated substance differently, as the following table reveals:
EPA
USDA
FDA
Regulated
Plant-Incorporated
Plant pest, regulated
Food, feed, food
Product
protectant.
article.
additive.
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Framework priorities, the National Research Council has
specifically noted that the data on which different agencies
base comparable analyses, and the scientific stringency with
which they conduct their analyses, are not comparably
rigorous. 74
Regulatory overlap also has been a problem for
biotechnology. Multiple agencies have authority over similar
issues, resulting in inefficient duplication of regulatory
resources and effort. 75 In certain instances, different agencies
request the same information about the same biotechnology
product from the same firms, but do not share the information
or coordinate their work. 76 The worst case scenario for overlap
is for agencies to reach differing conclusions concerning the
same product. This occurred for two agencies reviewing the
potential for transgenic cotton to cross with wild cotton in parts
of the United States. One agency concluded that “[n]one of the
relatives of cotton found in the United States . . . show any
definite weedy tendencies,” 77 while another found that there
would be a risk of transgenic cotton crossing with species of
wild cotton in southern Florida, southern Arizona, and
Hawaii. 78
Agency inexperience also has proven problematic in the
regulation of biotechnology. In 1998 the EPA approved a
registration for StarLink, a variety of corn genetically modified

Organism engineered
Pesticidal substance
Human food (whole
to contain sequences from or processed),
and genetic material
animal feed.
plant pests.
necessary for its
production.
See NRC 2000 REPORT, supra note 67, at 159 (the table reproduced above has
been modified to reflect changes to agency definitions since the table was
originally published).
74. See NRC 2000 REPORT, supra note 67, at 170-71.
75. Mandel, supra note 65, at 2243-44.
76. See id. at 2244.
77. JOHN H. PAYNE, USDA /APHIS PETITION 97-013-01P FOR
DETERMINATION OF NONREGULATED STATUS FOR EVENTS 31807 AND 31808
COTTON: ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT AND FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT
IMPACT
6
(1997),
available
at
http://web.archive.org/web/20010702230537/http://www.aphis.usda.gov/biotech
/dec_docs/9701301p_ea.HTM.
78. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, BIOPESTICIDES REGISTRATION
ACTION
DOCUMENT
IIC9-IIC10
(2000),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/oscpmont/sap/meetings/2000/october/brad3_enviroassessm
ent.pdf.
Regulated
Substance
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to be pest-resistant. 79 StarLink corn was only approved for use
as animal feed and non-food industrial purposes, such as
ethanol production; it was not approved for human
consumption because it carries transgenic genes that express a
protein containing some attributes of known human
allergens. 80
In September 2000, StarLink corn was discovered in
various brands of taco shells and later in many other human
food products, eventually resulting in the recall of over three
hundred products. 81 Several of the United States’ largest food
producers were forced to stop production at certain plants due
to concerns about StarLink contamination, and there was a
sharp reduction in United States corn exports. 82 The owner of
the StarLink registration agreed to buy back the year’s entire
crop of StarLink corn, at a cost of about $100 million. 83 It was
anticipated that StarLink-related costs could end up running
as high as $1 billion. 84
It turned out that the same harvesting, storage, shipping,
and processing equipment are often used for both human and
animal food. 85 Corn from myriad farms is commingled as it is
gathered, stored, and transported. 86 In fact, due to recognized
commingling, the agricultural industry regularly accepts about
2-7% of foreign matter in bulk shipments of corn in the United
States. 87 In addition, growers of StarLink corn had been
inadequately warned about the need to keep StarLink corn
segregated from other corn, leading to further commingling in
grain elevators. 88

79. See Sutter v. Aventis CropScience USA Holding, Inc., 145 F. Supp. 2d
1050, 1052 (S.D. Iowa 2001).
80. See In re StarLink Corn Prods. Liab. Litig., 212 F. Supp. 2d 828, 834
(N.D. Ill. 2002); Sutter, 145 F. Supp. 2d at 1052.
81. Mandel, supra note 65, at 2204.
82. Id.
83. Andrew Pollack, European Company Will Buy Entire Crop of Corn in
Recall, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2000, at C14.
84. James Cox, StarLink Fiasco Wreaks Havoc in the Heartland:
Developer Wants EPA To Approve Seed for Food Supply, USA TODAY, Oct. 27,
2000, at 1B.
85. See In re StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 834.
86. See id.
87. Andrew Pollack, Labeling Genetically Altered Food Is Thorny Issue,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2000, at A1.
88. See Barnaby J. Feder, Farmers Cite Scarce Data In Corn Mixing:
Companies’ Warnings Are Called Inadequate, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 17, 2000, at C1.
See also In re StarLink Corn, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 838.
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Someone with working knowledge of the country’s
agricultural system would have recognized from the outset that
it was inevitable that once StarLink corn was grown, produced,
and processed on a large-scale basis, some of it would make its
According to one
way into the human food supply. 89
agricultural expert, “[a]nyone who understands the grain
handling system . . . would know that it would be virtually
impossible to keep StarLink corn separate from corn that is
used to produce human food.” 90 The EPA, however, lacked the
relevant expertise to recognize this problem, and failed to
realize the limits of their experience in regulating pesticides
when applied to a new technology.
B. NANOTECHNOLOGY
The admonition “to be aware of what you do not know and
to recognize the limits of foresight” is clearly a difficult one to
follow. This lesson does, however, provide important guidance
for handling new technology. Most critically, it highlights the
need for legal regimes governing new technologies to be flexible
and reveals that it should be anticipated that preexisting legal
regimes may run into problems when being used to govern
technology that did not exist when the legal regimes were
created.
A leading current candidate for application of these
understandings is the management of nanotechnology.
Nanotechnology concerns the ability to build matter atom by
atom. This capability has only recently been scientifically
realized, and will increasingly impact a vast array of
industries, including medicine and health care, materials
science,
electronics
and
computers,
and
optics. 91
Nanotechnology development and commercialization already is
raising, and will continue to raise, concerns regarding risks to
human health, safety, and the environment. 92 Knowledge
89. George Anthan, OK Sought for Corn in Food, DES MOINES REG., Oct.
26, 2000, at 1D. The EPA later acknowledged “that the limited approval for
StarLink was unworkable.” Id.
90. Id.
91. See
National
Nanotechnology
Initiative,
Nanotech
Facts,
http://www.nano.gov/html/facts/home_facts.html (last visited Apr. 07, 2007).
92. See generally Gregory Mandel, Governing Nanotechnology
(unpublished manuscript). Some potential risks of nanomaterials include
toxicity due to inhalation, ingestion, or dermal contact with nanomaterials.
Id.
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concerning these risks is extremely limited because of the
nascent stage of the technology. 93 In addition, the risks are
extremely difficult to characterize because matter behaves
differently at the nanoscale. 94 Due to differences that result
from nanomaterials’ low weight, high surface-area-to-weight
ratio, and potential indestructibility, a compound that is
innocuous at the macroscale may have a significantly different
risk profile when it is only several atoms in size. 95 As the
ability to manufacture engineered nanomaterials is a recent
technological achievement, research into the health and
environmental effects of nanomaterials is in its infancy and is
permeated by uncertainty. 96
Undoubtedly, nanotechnology development will raise new
legal issues, some of which are beginning to be perceived,
others of which are entirely unforeseeable at this time. 97 As
the legal system evolves to handle nanotechnology issues, it is
important to remember the lessons learned from past
technology development. A legal system that is flexible,
recognizes the unpredictability of new issues, realizes that new
issues may not fit well into preexisting legal constructs, and
which is operated by legal actors who take a measured view of
the technology will operate far better in managing
nanotechnology than a system that fails to learn these lessons.
CONCLUSION
This article presents several lessons concerning the legal
system’s adaptation to new legal issues brought about by
technological advance, and explains how these lessons can be
applied to future law and technology issues. One critique of
these lessons as a theory of law and technology is that the
theory is actually a general legal theory, not one limited to law
and technology. The suggestions to consider the legal basis for
existing doctrines before extending them to new application, for
instance, is appropriate for all manner of legal decisions, not
just law and technology. This critique has some merit, but also
93. Rick DelVecchio, Berkeley Considering Need for Nano Safety, S. F.
CHRON., Nov. 24, 2006, at A1.
94. See Mandel, supra note 92.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. For example, many health and environmental statutes are based on
the assumption that chemical uses or releases below certain mass or quantity
thresholds do not present a significant risk. Nanomaterial toxicity may not
adhere to these previous assumptions and understandings. Id.
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is limited. There are two overarching reasons why the theory
presented here is one of law and technology in particular.
First, certain of the lessons offered are applicable only to law
and technology issues—for example, that legal decision-makers
should not let their amazement with new technology overrun
their legal analysis, or that legal regimes developed prior to the
advent of a technology often reveal gaps and other problems
when applied to new technology issues. Second, for those
lessons that have significant applicability outside of law and
technology, the interaction of technological development and
the legal system renders the lessons particularly pertinent for
resolving new technological disputes. Determining the basis
for legal constructs before extending them applies in many
situations. But, the nature of technological advance means
that recognition of this consideration is a ubiquitous concern
for handling new legal disputes caused by technological
advance, not just the occasional concern presented in other
areas.
Despite the indescribably diverse manners of technological
advance, and the correspondingly diverse range of new legal
issues that arise in relation to such advance, the legal system’s
response to new law and technology issues reveals important
similarities. These similarities provide lessons for a general
theory of law and technology. Each lesson will not apply
equally to every new law and technology dispute, but the
lessons do provide valuable guidance for adapting law to a wide
variety of future technological advances.

